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HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS—THE IMPACT OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE
KOSOVO SPECIALIST CHAMBERS OF 26 APRIL 2017
Göran Sluiter*
INTRODUCTION
By their very nature, international criminal tribunals will in their operation impact
individual rights, such as the right to liberty and the right to a fair trial. Without a con-
stitution and without a history in developing due process norms, international criminal
tribunals have to provide for instant incorporation of human rights in their respective
criminal proceedings.
However, the circumstances under which international criminal tribunals are
established are often complex, while at the same time their creation is considered to
be a matter of urgency. As a result, there may not always be sufficient attention to
human rights law’s position and rank in the applicable sources of law during the cre-
ation of international criminal tribunals. In practice, the effect of human rights law
in international criminal proceedings has proven at times to be problematic. Without
elaborate written procedural rules, it may be uncertain what the precise scope of the
proceedings’ interference with individual rights and liberties is, or ought to be.
On April 26, 2017, the Constitutional Chamber of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers
(KSC) reviewed the due process content of the KSC’s newly drafted Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence (RPE).1 It concluded that the RPE adopted by the Judges were
inconsistent with human rights in a number of ways,2 especially because of its lack of
sufficiently detailed rules governing investigations which interfere with individual
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1 Judgment on the Referral of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Adopted by Plenary on
17 March 2017 to the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court Pursuant to Article 19(5)
of Law no. 05/L-053 on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office ¶¶ 2, 5–6
(Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.scp-ks.org/en/documents/judgment-referral-rules-procedure-and
-evidence-26-apr-2017 [https://perma.cc/3HAV-UCHG] [hereinafter April 2017 KSC Judgment].
2 Id. ¶ 215.
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rights, such as search and seizure operations and wiretaps.3 It raises the question—the
subject of this Article—whether the KSC has raised the bar in terms of the principle
of procedural legality and whether the current loose approach in international criminal
proceedings to investigative powers is in violation of international human rights law.
If this research question is answered in the affirmative, it would necessitate a signifi-
cant overhaul of the organization of international criminal proceedings, especially
in its pretrial phase.
In order to answer the aforementioned research question, I first provide an over-
view and analysis of the position of human rights in international criminal proceedings.
Next, I examine how international criminal proceedings have been organized in relation
to international human rights law. In Part III, my focus shifts to the KSC, where I first
provide information and background on the creation of the KSC before ultimately
analyzing the April 2017 judgment of the KSC’s constitutional chamber. Its impact
on the protection of rights and the organization of international criminal proceedings
will be the subject of Section V.B. The Article ends with concluding observations.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS—
THEIR PLACE IN THE APPLICABLE SOURCES OF LAW
A. Applicability
The main contemporary international criminal tribunals, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),4 the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR),5 the International Criminal Court (ICC),6 and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL)7 were established and operate in an era in which international
human rights law must be duly reflected and part of their applicable law. If this were
not the case, many states would be prevented from ratifying or supporting this new
criminal justice system.
3 Id. ¶¶ 76–95.
4 See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph
2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993), adopted by S.C. Res.
827, ¶ 1 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute] (“[E]stablish[ing] an international [criminal]
tribunal . . . in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.”).
5 See S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute] (“[E]stablish[ing] an inter-
national tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda.”).
6 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
3, art. 1 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“Establish[ing]” “[a]n International Criminal Court.”).
7 See Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (with Statute), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
137, art. 1 [hereinafter SCSL Statute] (“[E]stablish[ing] a Special Court for Sierra Leone to
prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone.”).
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As a result, the statutes of international criminal tribunals contain—or reflect—the
majority of human rights standards that are relevant to criminal proceedings.8 The
right to a fair trial is at the heart of criminal proceedings and has, as incorporated in
the law of international criminal tribunals, largely been based on Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).9 It should be noted
8 Article 21 of the ICTY Statute, Article 20 of the ICTR Statute, Article 17 of the Agreement
Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone and Article 67 of the Rome Statute contain the rights of the ac-
cused. See SCSL Statute, supra note 7, art. 17 (“Rights of the accused”); Rome Statute, supra
note 6, art. 67 (“Rights of the accused”); ICTR Statute, supra note 5, art. 20 (“Rights of the ac-
cused”); ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 21 (“Rights of the accused”). RPE 42 common to the
ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL encompass the rights of persons during investigation. See Int’l Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.50, r.42 (July 8, 2015) [hereinafter ICTY RPE]; Int’l Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide & Other Serious Violations
of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda & Rwandan Citizens Respon-
sible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r.42 (May 13, 2015) [hereinafter ICTR RPE], http://unictr
.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/150513-rpe-en-fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJL9-FCNH];
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r.42 (May 31, 2012), http://
www.rscsl.org/Documents/RPE.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU69-93V6]. Note that the right not
to be subjected to an unlawful arrest or detention is missing from the ICTY Statute and ICTR
Statute. Compare ICTR Statute, supra note 5 (omitting such a right), and ICTY Statute, supra
note 4, art. 2(g) (providing for prosecution of persons committing “unlawful deportation or
transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian,” but no corresponding right to release from
unlawful confinement), with International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 9(4) [hereinafter ICCPR] (“Anyone who is deprived of his lib-
erty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the
detention is not lawful.”), and Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 5(4) [hereinafter ECHR] (“Everyone who
is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which
the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered
if the detention is not lawful.”). In that regard, the Rome Statute provides in Article 85 for com-
pensation to a victim of unlawful arrest or detention, from which the right could be derived.
See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 85(1) (“Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”).
9 See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDERS’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 226 (1995) (“The International
Tribunal must fully respect the rights of the accused set forth in Article 21 of the Statute, which
is based largely on Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”). Of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR), and the ICCPR, the ICCPR’s test regarding the right to a fair trial in Article
14 “is the most complete.” See David Harris, The Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Proceedings
as a Human Right, 16 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 352, 377 (1967) (“The three human rights treaty texts
[the ECHR, the ACHR, and the ICCPR] between them define the right to a fair trial in criminal
proceedings in full and basically satisfactory terms. . . . Of the three, the United Nations text
is the most complete.”). This is also acknowledged in the case law of ad hoc tribunals. See,
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that other rights relevant to criminal proceedings, such as the right not to be subjected
to inhumane and degrading treatment10 and the right to privacy,11 are—as rights—
not directly part of the applicable laws of international criminal tribunals. This raises
the question of whether these rights still apply to the functioning of international crimi-
nal tribunals. In this regard, it should be mentioned that, not being states, interna-
tional criminal tribunals are not parties to international human rights treaties.12
Starting with the ICTY and ICTR, their statutes do not contain any provision on the
sources of law to be applied.13 The inclusion of a provision as to the sources of law to
be applied by the ICTY and ICTR would have offered guidance in the proper applica-
tion and interpretation of sources of law, especially with respect to human rights law.14
However, it is clear from the drafting history of the ICTY and ICTR that they were
nevertheless tasked to operate in full conformity with existing human rights law.15
e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 54, fn. 57 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for Rwanda, Appeals Chamber, June 1, 2001), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case
-documents/ictr-95-1/appeals-chamber-judgements/en/010601.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J2C
-AV29] (“Article 20 [of the ICTR Statute] and various provisions of the Rules set forth the
rights of the accused by echoing the guarantees contained in international and regional instru-
ments[,]” including “Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[.]”);
Prosecutor v. Tadiæ, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 42 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 1995), http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm [https://perma.cc/S524-JTPG] (“The fair trial
guarantees in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have been
adopted almost verbatim in Article 21 of the Statute.”).
10 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 7; ECHR, supra note 8, art. 3.
11 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 17; ECHR, supra note 8, art. 8.
12 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 1(3) (articulating the ICCPR’s obligations as
applying to “states parties to the present Covenant”); ECHR, supra note 8, at 222 (describing
parties to the Convention as “Governments of European countries”).
13 See ICTR Statute, supra note 5, ¶ 1 (making no mention of required sources of law to
apply to cases other than explaining the purpose of the tribunal as “prosecuting persons re-
sponsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law”); ICTY
Statute, supra note 4, ¶ 1 (making no mention of required sources of law to apply to cases other
than explaining the purpose of the tribunal as “prosecuti[ng] persons responsible for serious vio-
lations of international humanitarian law”).
14 See Sergey Vasiliev, General Rules and Principles of International Criminal Procedure:
Definition, Legal Nature, and Identification, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TO-
WARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW (Göran Sluiter & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2009) (providing
a comprehensive discussion of the treatment of sources by the ad hoc tribunals); see also Ilias
Bantekas, Reflections on Some Sources and Methods of International Criminal and Humani-
tarian Law, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 121, 121–36 (2006).
15 See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter Dated Oct. 1 1994 from the Secretary-General
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 2, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (Oct. 4, 1994)
(calling for ICTR to “appl[y] and adjudicat[e] . . . international law on individual responsibility
for serious human rights violations”); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), ¶ 106, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
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This follows from the well-known Secretary-General’s statement in its report on the
establishment of ICTY:
It is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect
internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the
accused at all stages of its proceedings. In the view of the
Secretary-General, such internationally recognized standards are,
in particular, contained in article 14 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.16
This statement, however, does not inform us as to how international human rights
laws precisely enter the applicable laws of the ICTY and ICTR or how they bind the
tribunals in their functioning.
The status of the ICTY and ICTR as subsidiary organs of the U.N. Security
Council means that they do not operate in a legal vacuum.17 It has been asserted that
the tribunals are bound by “the general normative framework constituted by the
international legal order.”18 In this regard, the obligation of international organiza-
tions to observe general international law,19 including human rights standards, is
currently regarded as resulting from the attribution of international legal personality
to international organizations.20 International organizations are created under inter-
national law, and thus, as subjects of international law, they are bound by general
international law.21 As subsidiary organs, the ICTY and ICTR have inherited their
16 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), supra note 15, ¶ 106.
17 The U.N. Security Council established the ICTY and ICTR using its Chapter VII author-
ity under the U.N. Charter. ICTR Statute, supra note 5, at 2; S.C. Res. 827, 2 (May 25, 1993).
18 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era: On the “Frag-
mentation” of International Law, 1 EUR. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 25, 27 (2007). See also Prosecutor
v. Kupreškiæ, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 539 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000).
19 For the purposes of this Article, “general international law” is regarded as customary
law including the general principles of law, without excluding the possibility that conventional
law can be regarded as general, insofar as it became a custom. See Grigory Tunkin, Is General
International Law Customary Law Only?, 4 EUR. J. OF INT’L LAW 534, 538 (1993) (“Primarily
as a result of the codification and progressive development of international law, a number of
general multilateral treaties have become or are becoming part of general international law.”).
20 E.g., C. F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS 399–400 (2005); August Reinisch, The Changing International Legal Frame-
work for Dealing with Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 46
(Philip Alston ed., 2005); Karel Wellens, REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANISA-
TIONS 1 (2002).
21 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its opinion on the Interpretation of the
Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, considered that “[i]nternational
organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations
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obligations under general international law from the obligations incumbent upon the
United Nations as an international organization.22 Moreover, Articles 1 and 55 of the
U.N. Charter set forth the fundamental purposes and principles of the organization,
which include respect for the “principles of justice and international law” and the
promotion and encouragement of “respect for . . . human rights and fundamental
freedoms,”23 and the U.N. Charter enjoys primacy over all other obligations.24 The
importance of compliance of international criminal tribunals with international stan-
dards of human rights is furthermore stressed by the fact that the most important human
rights instruments, such as the ICCPR, were developed under the auspices of the
United Nations and adopted by the General Assembly.25 In that regard, the fact that
the catalogue of human rights in the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR is not complete
does not imply that the Security Council had the intention to deviate from interna-
tionally recognized human rights.26
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law. . . .” Advisory Opinion, 1980
ICJ 73, ¶ 37 (Dec. 20). Similarly, the European Court of Justice stated that “the European
Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers . . . .” Case C-286/90,
Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen, 1992 E.C.R. I-6048, ¶ 9, cited with approval in Case C-
162/96, A. Racke GmGH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998 E.C.R. I-3688, ¶ 45. See also
Case T-231/04, Hellenic Republic v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys. 2007 E.C.R. II-66,
¶ 85 (“[T]he principle of good faith is a rule of customary international law . . . which . . . is
binding . . . on the Community . . . .”).
22 As previously noted, both the Statutes of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals were
adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, thus constitute subsi-
diary organs of the U.N. Security Council. See ICTR Statute, supra note 5, at 2; S.C. Res. 827,
2 (May 25, 1993).
23 U.N. Charter art. 1, art. 55(c), ¶1.
24 Id. art. 103.
25 The adoption of these important human rights instruments, such as the ICCPR, by the
General Assembly shows the universal recognition of the importance of these human rights stan-
dards. See G.A. Res. 2200, ¶ 1 (Dec. 16, 1966).
26 Consider also the dissenting opinion of Judge Pocar to the Appeals Chamber Judgement,
where he states that:
ICCPR is not only a treaty between States which have ratified it, but,
like other human rights treaties, also a document that was adopted—
unanimously—as a resolution by the General Assembly. As such, it also
expresses the view of the General Assembly as to the principles enshrined
therein. It would therefore have to be assumed that the Security Council,
as a UN body, would act in compliance with that declaration of principles
of the General Assembly. Only a clear-cut decision to depart from it
would lead to a different conclusion. But in this case, as mentioned, the in-
tention of the Security Council to comply with the ICCPR was explicitly
demonstrated through its approval of the Report of the Secretary General.
Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgement, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Pocar, 2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, App. Chamber May 26, 2003) http://unictr.irmct.org
/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-3/appeals-chamber-judgements/en/030526.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2783-28KJ].
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It can thus convincingly be claimed that international human rights norms are
binding on the ICTY and ICTR—even if the due process norms have not been fully
incorporated in their statutes and RPE—as a matter of law, and not merely policy
considerations.27
This has been acknowledged in practice. According to the judges of the ICTY,
“[an international criminal court] ought to be rooted in the rule of law and offer all
guarantees embodied in the relevant international instruments.”28 Further, “it must
provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full confor-
mity with internationally recognized human rights instruments.”29
Contrary to the ICTY and ICTR, the Rome Statute contains a list of sources to
be applied by the International Criminal Court. Article 21 of the Statute does not
only exhaustively set out the applicable sources of law but also establishes some sort
of hierarchical relationship among the different sources to be applied.30 The applicable
27 See Salvatore Zappalà, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 5,
7, 47–48 (2003) (“[T]he starting point adopted in this book is that this is more a policy issue
than a legal question. And the policy choice has been made in favour of an extension to inter-
national criminal proceedings of international human rights provisions on due process . . . .
With regard to the extension of due process principles to international criminal trials, it is
submitted that although there was no one specific rule imposing on States the obligation to
extend human rights safeguards to the international level, there were (and are), nonetheless,
several good reasons to support this extension. In particular, in the case of UN ad hoc
Tribunals it would have been inconsistent for the Security Council not to impose respect for
UN standards. . . . This extension has been realized by the express decision of the Security
Council and the UN Diplomatic Conference to ensure the highest standards of fairness in
international criminal proceedings.”).
28 Prosecutor v. Tadiæ, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 42 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals
Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm [https://perma.cc
/FN5Z-5R37].
29 Id. ¶ 45. See also Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision
on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction, ¶ 55 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone, App. Chamber
Mar. 13, 2004) (“[The Special Court] must be established according to proper international cri-
teria; it must have the mechanisms and facilities to dispense even-handed justice, providing
at the same time all the guarantees of fairness and it must be in tune with international human
rights instruments.”).
30 According to Article 21 of the Rome Statute:
1. The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the
principles and rules of international law, including the established prin-
ciples of the international law of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from
national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate,
the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction
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sources of law have been set out in a hierarchical order in paragraph 1 of Article 21
of the Rome Statute, starting with the Statute itself as the most important source of
law, followed by general principles of law as an intermediate source of law, and,
finally national laws as the most subsidiary sources of law.31 Paragraph 3 of the
same article gives international human rights law the most prominent place among
applicable laws to the ICC.32 According to that section, “[t]he application and in-
terpretation of [the] law . . . must be consistent with internationally recognized
human rights, and be [non-discriminatory] . . . .”33 This paragraph provides for a
prioritized position of these norms above all others mentioned in the Article,
including the Rome Statute.34
Consistent with this view, the ICC Appeals Chamber has acknowledged that
“[h]uman rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it,” and that “[i]ts provisions
must be interpreted and more importantly applied in accordance with internationally
recognized human rights. . . .”35 In other decisions, the Court has used the label of
“general principle of interpretation” in reference to Article 21(3) of the Rome
Statute,36 which arguably refers to the status of “internationally recognized human
rights” as not constituting the source of law per se.37
over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with
this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized
norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its
previous decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must
be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without
any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in
article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, poli-
tical or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or
other status.
Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 21.
31 See id. art. 21, ¶ 1.
32 See id. art. 21, ¶ 3.
33 Id.
34 See Alain Pellet, Applicable Law, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1051, 1080 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (“[T]hese
‘internationally recognized human rights’ [in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute] take precedence
over all other applicable rules.”).
35 Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-772, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶ 37 (Dec. 14, 2006).
36 Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure
and the Establishment of a Timetable, annex I, ¶ 2 (May 15, 2006). See also Prosecutor v. Dyilo,
ICC-01/04-01/06-679, Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proof-
ing, ¶ 10 (Nov. 8, 2006) (“[T]he Chamber recalls the general principle of interpretation set
out in article 21(3) of the [Rome] Statute . . . .”).
37 See Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the
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What implications can be drawn from what appears to be a rather theoretical,
even semantical, distinction? In light of the precedence of human rights norms, the
interpretation and application of the applicable law of Article 21(1) and (2) of the
Rome Statute cannot infringe on internationally recognized human rights norms.
Furthermore, it is argued that the room for “contextual interpretation [and applica-
tion] of the relevant provisions,” in accordance with “the need to safeguard the
uniqueness of the criminal procedure of the International Criminal Court,”38 is out-
lined by the above elaborated nature of human rights. In light of their minimum
nature it is rather clear that the implementation of applicable law of the ICC can
amount to more favorable results, in the sense of better individual protection. How-
ever, these protections cannot fall below the minimum prescribed by the interna-
tional human rights standards.39
In the ICC’s practice, it remains uncertain whether human rights law, applying
the priority rule of Article 21(3), can indeed set aside conflicting rules in the Rome
Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence. In the case of Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo,40
the Court was left to decide the fate of witnesses who had applied for asylum in the
Netherlands; the witnesses’ goal of asylum came in direct conflict with the Court’s
obligation to return them to Congo, pursuant to Article 93(7)(b) of the Statute.41
The ICC Appeals Chamber said the following on this matter:
First, article 21(3) of the Statute requires that article 93(7) of the
Statute be applied and interpreted in conformity with interna-
tionally recognised human rights; it does not require the Court
to violate its obligations pursuant to article 93(7)(b) of the Stat-
ute. Furthermore, such an interpretation would seriously damage
the Court’s ability to enter into future cooperation agreements
with States, which would undermine the Court’s ability to obtain
needed testimony and evidence and render it more difficult to
establish the truth in the cases before it.42
Establishment of a Timetable, at annex I, ¶ 2 ; Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-679, Decision on the
Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, at ¶ 10.
38 Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the Estab-
lishment of a Timetable, at annex I, ¶ 4.
39 In other words, Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute has been interpreted by the ICC as
providing a floor of minimum human rights protection, on top of which the ICC might afford
individuals greater protection. See id. at annex I, ¶¶ 1–4.
40 Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12-158, Order on the Implementation of the Cooperation
Agreement Between the Court and the Democratic Republic of the Congo Concluded Pursu-
ant Article 93(7) of the Statute, ¶¶ 2–5 (Jan. 20, 2014).
41 Id.
42 Id. ¶ 26.
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Rather, through means of harmonious interpretation, the Court will seek to respect
human rights law, without setting aside its own applicable law.43
B. Content and Scope
Some attention must be given to the matter of content and scope of human rights
in the context of international criminal proceedings. Two matters need to be dis-
cussed. First, there is the question of how limitation clauses in human rights apply to
international criminal justice. Second, attention will be paid, albeit briefly, to the
question of whether human rights law—which was developed to be applied in and by
states,44—needs some recalibration in the context of international criminal justice.
As far as the limitation of human rights is concerned, the point of departure is
that exceptions must be “narrowly interpreted”45 and that any restriction “must be
convincingly established.”46 Specifically in relation to the right to a fair trial, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has rejected a restrictive interpretation
by emphasizing that “[i]n a democratic society within the meaning of the Conven-
tion, the right to a fair administration of justice holds such a prominent place that a
restrictive interpretation of Article 6(1) would not correspond to the aim and the
purpose of that provision . . . .”47
A right can only be limited when the foundation of the interference is in law
(clear and foreseeable rules), the restriction is necessary for a democratic society
(proportionality and subsidiarity), and there is a legitimate aim to restrict the rights.48
In the context of international criminal tribunals, these limitation clauses may not
be applied without some degree of transformation or recalibration.49 For example,
43 See id. ¶ 28 (“Thus, the question before the Appeals Chamber is how the second sentence
of article 93 (7) (6) of the [Rome] Statute should be interpreted and applied so that it does not
frustrate the Detained Witnesses’ right to an effective remedy from the Netherlands with respect
to their asylum claims.”).
44 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 1(3) (articulating the ICCPR’s obligations as applying
to “States Parties to the present Covenant”); ECHR, supra note 8, at 222 (describing parties to
the Convention as “Governments of European countries”).
45 E.g., Klass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 17 (1978).
46 E.g., Funke v. France, 256 Eur. Ct. H. R. 21, 24 (1993).
47 Delcourt v. Belgium, 11 Eur. Ct. H. R. 1, 15 (1970).
48 See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 8, art. 8(2):
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
49 See KRIT ZEEGERS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
ADHERENCE AND CONTEXTUALIZATION 99 (2016) (“It may be possible to establish that a given
human rights norm is customary or provides an ‘internationally recognized human right,’ or
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whether or not a restriction of a right is necessary in a democratic society is not some-
thing that can be easily assessed in the context of the international legal order.50 It may
thus be wise not to apply this element of the restriction test. Conversely, the require-
ment that the interference with a right must take place in accordance with the law,
which is sufficiently clear and foreseeable, is a requirement that could by and large also
apply to international criminal tribunals. This will be analyzed in far more detail below.
With respect to certain rights, the question also arises whether their content
requires recalibration in light of the unique character of international criminal jus-
tice. In this regard, one can think of the right to an independent tribunal, which in
a national justice system is assessed along the lines of separation of powers that cannot
be easily transposed to the international level.51 Krit Zeegers has done groundbreaking
work in coming up with a framework that should govern these issues of readjusting—or
recalibrating—human rights law in international criminal proceedings.52 The bottom
even to identify specific obligations that stem from it. But even in such cases, these obligations
will be addressed to a state, not to an ICT.”).
50 See id. at 99–100:
Similar considerations apply to concepts such as limitations and de-
rogations, which equally presume the existence of a state. For example,
states may limit the enjoyment of certain human rights, provided that such
limitations are ‘prescribed by law,’ ‘pursue a legitimate aim,’ and are
‘necessary in a democratic society.’ States are also permitted to derogate
from certain human rights obligations in times of ‘public emergency
threatening the life of the nation.’ How should such requirements apply
to an ICT? Can they also limit human rights and, if so, what meaning
should the terms such as ‘prescribed by law,’ ‘democratic society,’ and
‘the nation’ be given in the context of an ICT? They cannot simply be
copy-pasted and applied to an ICT because its law is fundamentally
different from that of a state; it is not a ‘democratic society’ nor does it
have a ‘nation’ whose life can be threatened. Given the ICTs’ limited
mandates and the fundamentally different way in which they exercise
public power, it is not obvious how such requirements could operate in
their context. If these norms are to be applied to non-state entities, they
must be translated and be given a meaning that fits the ICTs’ context.
(footnotes omitted).
51 See id. at 99:
For example, the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tri-
bunal, being part of the right to a fair trial, should surely apply to an ICT
under a functional approach to its human rights obligations. However,
the requirement of independence and impartiality in IHRL is closely con-
nected to Montesquieuean conceptions of the separation of powers. Since
no such structures apply at the international level, the question arises how
this requirement should be shaped when applied to an ICT.
(footnotes omitted).
52 See id. at 355–95 (“This chapter develops a methodological framework for the properly
contextualized interpretation and application of human rights norms by the ICTs in their pro-
cedural practice.”).
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line is that it should be a thorough process in which care should be taken that the end
result is not one of reduced protection:
In order to truly adhere to IHRL, the ICTs must sometimes
contextualize their interpretation and application of human rights
norms. The circumstances in which an ICT operates can funda-
mentally differ from the circumstances in which international
human rights norms normally apply. To ensure the effective
protection of these norms in the context of an ICT, this specific
context must be taken into account in the interpretation and
application of human rights norms. As has been noted, ‘genuine
fairness and justice are contextually defined’.
However, the ICTs do not employ a coherent methodology
for the interpretation and application of human rights norms in
their procedural practice. In addition, when they contextualize
human rights norms, this too often results in underprotection.
This is of particular concern because the ICTs’ practice of con-
textualization is often improperly justified, either because their
legal reasoning is inadequate, or because they fail to offer any
legal reasoning to substantiate their deviation. It has been noted
that ‘the ICTs have not sufficiently focused on providing a
proper analysis in which both the concrete human rights norm
and the unique position of ICTs are adequately deconstructed.’53
There are, unfortunately, some examples in the case law of international crimi-
nal tribunals, notably the ICTY and ICTR, in which the special character of interna-
tional criminal proceedings has played a role in reducing the protection of human
rights as they otherwise would have been available at the national level.
In the very early years of the ICTY, the Trial Chamber issued a decision in 1995
in the Tadiæ case, which—for puzzling reasons—went a long way in dismissing the in-
terpretation of human rights law by international and regional human rights courts.54
The Trial Chamber held that “the interpretation given by other judicial bodies to Article
14 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR is only of limited relevance in applying
the provisions of the Statute and Rules of the International Tribunal.”55 As such:
[I]n interpreting the provisions which are applicable to the Interna-
tional Tribunal and determining where the balance lies between
53 Id. at 392 (footnotes omitted).
54 See Prosecutor v. Tadiæ, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, ¶¶ 27–30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tdec/en/100895pm.htm
[https://perma.cc/AL3C-V5MF].
55 Id. ¶ 27 (emphasis added).
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the accused’s right to a fair and public trial and the protection of
victims and witnesses, the Judges of the International Tribunal
must do so within the context of its own unique legal framework.56
This unique context is stressed by the affirmative obligation stated in the Statute to
protect victims and witnesses, which neither ICCPR nor ECHR lists;57 the gravity
of offenses prosecuted by the tribunal and the fact that the tribunal is “operating in
the midst of a continuing conflict and is without a police force or witness protection
program to provide protection for victims and witnesses.”58
Quite some years have passed since this decision was issued. In the interpreta-
tion of the Statute and Rules, the judges of all international criminal tribunals have
heavily relied on domestic case law and the case law of international human right
supervisory bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee and ECHR.59 It may thus
56 Id. (emphasis added).
57 Id. (“[N]either Article 14 of the ICCPR nor Article 6 of the European Convention of Hu-
man Rights . . . list the protection of victims and witnesses as one of its primary considerations.”).
58 Id. ¶¶ 27–28.
59 See, e.g., Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Judgement (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda, App. Chamber May 20, 2005), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files
/case-documents/ictr-97-20/appeals-chamber-judgements/en/050520.pdf [https://perma.cc
/3V62-ZEUY]; Prosecutor v. Tadiæ, Case No. IT-94-A-AR77, Appeal Judgment on Allegations
of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vugin (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia,
App. Chamber Feb. 27, 2001), http:// www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/vuj-aj010227e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/94WH-2XTX]; Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, Judge-
ment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 20, 2006), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files
/case-documents/ictr-98-44c/trial-judgements/en/060920.pdf [https://perma.cc/59ET-LSLN];
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
May 23, 2005), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-98-44a/appeals
-chamber-judgments/en/050523.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GXG-BS34]; Prosecutor v. Nikolic,
Case No. IT-94-2-PT, Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction
by the Tribunal (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 9, 2002), http://www.icty.org
/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tdec/en/10131553.htm [https://perma.cc/7X8Z-MJAY]; Prosecutor
v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on Momèilo Krajišnik’s Notice of Motion
for Provisional Release (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001), https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/f7195c/pdf/; Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision
on Motion by Momir Talic for Provisional Release (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Mar. 28, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/10328PR215226.htm [https://
perma.cc/R9AU-2HG7]; Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Motion
by Radoslav Brdanin for Provisional Release (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
July 25, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/00725PR213239.htm [https://
perma.cc/NR6K-59A4]; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30-PT, Decision on Motion
for Provisional Release of Miroslav Kvocka (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 2, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tdec/en/00202PR512949.htm [https://
perma.cc/8MGQ-A2ZR]; Prosecutor v. Dokmanovic, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, Decision on
the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanovic (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 22, 1997); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Zdravko
Mucic’s Motion for the Exclusion of Evidence (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
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appear that the protection of human rights law seems, on the surface, to be well up
to standards. However, as will be further explored in the following sections, this
may not be the case.
II. THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
AND THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS
The procedures of the ICTY and ICTR on the one hand and the ICC on the other
were shaped under unique circumstances.60 As previously discussed, there is no
background or tradition of criminal procedure for the contemporary international
criminal tribunals to fall back on.61 Moreover, the procedural law had to be created
as a matter of urgency, either because an international criminal tribunal needed to
be operational within very short notice—with the goal of restoring international
peace and security (i.e., the ICTY and ICTR), or because the momentum of negotia-
tions had to be seized (i.e., the ICC).62
In light of these facts and circumstances, it is understandable that the procedural
laws of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC are short and concise as compared to national
justice systems.63 The procedural laws of these institutions concentrate on the main
elements of procedure and leaves many aspects of investigations, especially, but also
of prosecution and trials, unregulated.64 In addition, as compared to national justice
systems, the laws of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC deal with aspects of their functioning
which are generally not part of the procedural codes in domestic justice systems,
such as the composition and organization of the court, and other institutional mat-
ters, including the election and ethical obligations for organs of the court.65
The following comes to mind when assessing the procedural components of the
laws of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC: The ICTY Statute contains thirty-four articles.66
Nine of them are directly relevant to its procedure, dealing with the power to collect
evidence, rights of the accused, cooperation with states, and protection of victims.67
Sept. 2, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tdec/en/70902732.htm [https://perma.cc
/7Z8X-A2E5].
60 On the creation of international criminal procedure, see INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND RULES (Göran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013) and CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2012).
61 See SAFFERLING, supra note 60, at 4.
62 See id. at 11–13.
63 Cf. id. at 14.
64 See id. at 2, 5.
65 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 34 (“Organs of the Court”); ICTY Statute, supra
note 4, art. 12 (“Composition of the Chambers”).
66 ICTY Statute, supra note 4.
67 These include: Art. 18: Investigation and preparation of indictment; Art. 19: Review of the
indictment; Art. 20: Commencement and conduct of trial proceedings; Art. 21: Rights of the
accused; Art. 22: Protection of victims and witnesses; Art. 23: Judgement; Art. 24: Penalties; Art.
25: Appellate proceedings; and Art, 26: Review proceedings. ICTY Statute, supra note 4.
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The Rules of Procedure of the ICTY, in contrast, are far more elaborate, consisting of
155 provisions.68 Around one hundred of them deal with procedure.69 Those dealing
with the totality of procedure, including appeals and review proceedings, appear
fairly restricted.70
As far as the ICC is concerned, the applicable procedural law is more comprehen-
sive than that of the ICTY and ICTR. In addition to a Statute and Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, there are also Regulations of the Court as a subsidiary source of law.71
All together, this makes for 479 provisions relating to procedure.72 A significant por-
tion of them are directly relevant to procedure, but do not go to such level of detail
in that they regulate all available investigative measures.73
It follows from a reading of the applicable laws of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC
that important aspects of the tribunals’ proceedings remain unregulated. For exam-
ple, all three are silent on various investigative measures which infringe on individual
rights, such as interception of telecommunications, search and seizure operations,
and modern investigative techniques including (covert) surveillance and infiltration
operations.74 Karel De Meester has studied, in depth, the scarcity of procedural rules
regulating investigations at international criminal tribunals.75 He already considered
this a significant problem from a human rights perspective:
It was concluded that the applicability of a procedural principle
of legality to the law of international criminal procedure cannot
easily be established, and how the incorporation thereof in the ICC
Statute was explicitly rejected during the negotiations. However,
even in the absence of this principle, in cases where investiga-
tive acts infringe upon the rights and liberties of the individuals
concerned, it follows from the lawfulness requirement (“in
accordance with the law”) under human rights law that sufficient
procedural safeguards should be in place. . . . It is doubtful
68 ICTY RPE, supra note 8.
69 See id., r.48–r.155.
70 See ICTY RPE, supra note 8.
71 See Regulations of the Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04 (May 28, 2004) [hereinafter ICC
Regulations]. In addition, there are also the Regulations of the Registry, but they are very much
of a practical, administrative nature and not as relevant for regulating the procedure.
72 See Rome Statute, supra note 6; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-PIDS-LT-02-
002/13-Eng (2013); ICC Regulations, supra note 71.
73 See, e.g., ICC Regulations, supra note 71, at Reg. 13 (describing how presiding judges
are selected).
74 See ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 21 (“Rights of the accused”); Rome Statute, supra
note 6, art. 55 (“Rights of persons during an investigation”); ICTR Statute, supra note 5, art.
20 (“Rights of the accused”).
75 See KAREL DE MEESTER, THE INVESTIGATION PHASE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: IN SEARCH OF COMMON RULES (2015).
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whether the current state of international criminal procedure is
in full conformity with this requirement.76
Drawing from interviews with staff working at international criminal tribunals,
De Meester found that the absence of detailed regulations governing procedures,
especially investigations, was not considered a significant problem.77 For example,
the majority of the ICTR Prosecution staff whom De Meester interviewed did not
find judicial authorization or review necessary for such coercive investigative
measures as search and seizure operations and wiretaps.78 Likewise, the majority of
judges and senior legal officers at the ICTR interviewed generally felt that judicial
authorization from an ICTR judge was unnecessary.79
In order to better understand these views, it may be surmised that the regulation
of international criminal proceedings, especially in the pretrial phase, is sufficiently
assured elsewhere. The procedure of international criminal tribunals extends over
various criminal justice systems. International criminal tribunals have no territories
or police forces of their own, but instead rely fully on the cooperation of others in
various investigative actions and in the arrests and surrender of suspects.80 The
question arises as to how national law is regarded by international criminal tribunals
when it comes to supplementing their own legal frameworks for investigations.
The laws of the ICTY and ICTR make reference to national law, but not so much
as a means capable of filling deficiencies in the applicable law.81 Rather, national law
is seen as a potential obstacle that could, for example, hinder the arrests of suspects
and their surrender to the ICTY and ICTR.82 In this respect, states are admonished
that they may not use national extradition law as an obstacle to arrest and sur-
render.83 While references to national law governing investigative acts or arrests at
the behest of the ICTY and ICTR are missing from their applicable laws, it is clear
76 Id. at 878.
77 See id. at 478–79.
78 See id. The Office of the Prosecutor has its own discretion in discerning what evidence is
needed, so long as it complies with governing state laws. Id. at 478.
79 Id. at 480.
80 See GÖRAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION AND THE COLLECTION
OF EVIDENCE: OBLIGATIONS OF STATES 7 (2002) (providing background on the importance
of cooperation in the collection of evidence by international criminal tribunals).
81 ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 29 (“Co-operation and judicial assistance”); ICTR Statute,
supra note 5, art. 8, 28 (“Concurrent jurisdiction” and “Cooperation and judicial assistance”).
82 ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 29 (“Co-operation and judicial assistance”); ICTR
Statute, supra note 5, art. 28 (“Cooperation and judicial assistance”).
83 See Rule 60 of the ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence:
The obligations laid down in Article 28 of the Statute shall prevail over
any legal impediment to the surrender or transfer of the accused or of a
detained witness to the [Tribunal] in accordance with Rule 58 that may
exist under the national law or treaties of the State concerned.
ICTY RPE, supra note 8, r.60.
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that many acts of assistance in that area have been executed by states in accordance
with their domestic laws and procedures.84 Many states have enacted special legislation
enabling them to cooperate with the ICTY and ICTR in investigations and arrests, and
which often refer to domestic criminal procedural law to be applied by analogy in many
instances.85 This means that the investigations and arrests performed in national justice
systems at the request of the ICTY and ICTR may, in practice, be governed by a more
detailed legal framework than can be found in the applicable law of these two tribu-
nals.86 That said, in situations where the prosecutor of the ICTY or ICTR directly
undertakes on-site investigations, where arrests and surrender are being done by in-
ternational (peacekeeping) forces instead of national authorities, or where investiga-
tions and arrests are performed in a failed state, there is no actual legal framework
governing the conduct of investigations and execution of arrest warrants.87
Compared to the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC contains more references to national law
in the execution of arrest warrants and requests for assistance in the collection of evi-
dence.88 It appears as if this may help ensure the regulation of these matters through the
applicable law. In Part 9 of the Rome Statute, dealing with cooperation between states
and the ICC, it is stipulated that requests for arrest and surrender are to be executed in
accordance with national law,89 and the same applies for other requests for assistance.90
The applicability of national law in the execution of requests for assistance is further-
more emphasized in Article 99(1) of the Statute: “Requests for assistance shall be
executed in accordance with the relevant procedure under the law of the requested State
and, unless prohibited by such law, in the manner specified in the request . . . .”91
The execution of arrest warrants is even the object of a separate provision in the
Statute, obliging states to organize their national proceedings in compliance with the
84 See UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGO-
SLAVIA, Member States Cooperation, http://www.icty.org/en/documents/member-states-co
operation [https://perma.cc/5ZZK-KWXG] (providing for an overview of national legislation
regulating cooperation with the ICTY—and also the ICTR).
85 See id.
86 See generally id.
87 De Meester is skeptical about this gap-filling potential of domestic law and practices:
Domestic requirements may not be provided for in the specific case or
[may be] circumvented. In addition, practice has proven that investigative
acts are sometimes executed through an agency (e.g. the execution of a
search and seizure operation by SFOR on behalf of the ICTY Prosecutor
in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Furthermore, the Prosecutor may sometimes
execute coercive measures directly on the territory of the state concerned.
In all of the above situations, gaps in the protection of suspects, accused
persons or persons otherwise affected by the investigations may arise.
DE MEESTER, supra note 75, at 878.
88 See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 58, 69.
89 See id. art. 89(1).
90 See id. art. 93(1).
91 Id. art. 99(1).
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rights of the arrested person.92 However, like at the ICTY and ICTR, the uncertainty
of applicable law subsists in situations of on-site investigations, investigations con-
ducted by or with the assistance of non-state actors, such as peacekeeping forces, or
investigations in a failed state.93 Taking the above into account, it cannot be said that,
across the board, the execution of investigations, and arrests on national territories at
the behest of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC are taking place in a legal vacuum. But the na-
ture and degree of detail, and the quality of the applicable national law may differ
greatly depending on the situation.
As an overarching issue concerning the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC, the question arises
as to whether, even with a national legal framework governing the acts of investiga-
tion, the applicable law is of sufficient detail and quality. This matter is at the heart
of this Article and will be further explored below in Part V.94
Individual rights find protection in the applicable law of ICTY, ICTR, and ICC,
primarily through their respective Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
When concentrating on the pretrial phase, investigations and arrests, one notices that
individual rights find protection in two ways. First, a number of provisions directly
contain individual rights, either as rights of the arrested person, rights of suspects,
rights of questioned persons, or fair trial rights. In this regard, the following provi-
sions can be mentioned: Article 20 of the ICTR Statute, Article 21 of the ICTY
Statute, Rule 40 of the ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and Arti-
cles 55 and 67 of the Statute.95 Second, attention must be given to those provisions
which may not directly reference individual rights, but which—by their operation—
include the protection of individual rights as an important objective. In the realm of
the right to individual liberty, an excellent example are those provisions in the laws
of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC dealing with the procedures for provisional release ap-
plications available for detained persons.96 These provisions ensure that detained
individuals have an effective right to challenge their ongoing detentions, and that
procedures are in place to have the detentions reviewed by a judge.97 In a similar vein,
the laws of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC include provisions under which the defendant
can submit an application to a Judge or Chamber for a request of legal assistance to
be sent to a state, by which the defendant wishes to collect evidence for the preparation
92 See id. art. 59.
93 On-site investigations in the context of the ICC have been regulated in Article 99(4)
and have been subjected to more conditions than at the ICTY and ICTR. See Rome Statute,
supra note 6, art. 99(4). Direct investigations by the Prosecutor in a territory of a failed State
can be authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber, without having secured the cooperation of that
State, pursuant to Article 57(3)(d) of the ICC Statute. See id. art. 57(3)(d).
94 See infra Part V.
95 See ICTY RPE, supra note 8, r.40; ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 21; Rome Statute,
supra note 6, art. 55, 67; ICTR Statute, supra note 5, art. 20.
96 See ICTY RPE, supra note 8, r.65; Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 60.
97 See ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 9; ECHR, supra note 8, art. 5.
2019] HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 641
of his or her defense.98 Clearly, these provisions aim at securing the defendant’s right
to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defense. These are
just a few examples.
It can thus be concluded that the famous statement of the Secretary-General at
the time of the creation of the ICTY—that it is “axiomatic” that human rights be
fully protected—has not been a hollow phrase.99 Indeed, the protection of individual
rights is part of the procedural regulations that have made their way into the applica-
ble law of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC. However, this Article focuses on whether the
lack of detailed procedural regulation of investigations is in and of itself problematic
from a human rights perspective, even if this is by no means the intention. The highest
judicial organ of the KSC appears to think so, as the following sections will show.
III. THE CREATION OF THE KOSOVO SPECIALIST CHAMBERS
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) is in several respects a unique new
member of the ever-expanding family of international and internationalized criminal
tribunals.100 The direct reasons for its creation appear to be that reported in the mem-
oirs of former ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte.101 In her book, Del Ponte alleges
that in the Summer of 1999, serious crimes were committed in Kosovo, in which a-
pproximately 300 Kosovo Albanians were transported to Albania for the purpose of
organ-harvesting for criminal gain.102 It was also claimed that the operation occurred
with involvement of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).103 This assertion triggered
an inquiry by Dick Marty for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
leading to a report published in 2010 (the “Marty Report”).104 The report offers a
more complex picture than Del Ponte’s book. According to the report, there is evi-
dence that a KLA faction had taken on a central role in organized crime and was
98 See the ICTR Statute, supra note 5, art. 18 and the ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 19, in
conjunction with ICTR RPE, supra note 8, art. 55 and ICTY RPE, supra note 8, art. 55. For the
ICC, see the Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 57(3)(d).
99 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), supra note 15, ¶ 106.
100 On the distinction between “international” and “internationalised” criminal tribunals, in
the context of the KSC, see Emanuele Cimiotta, The Specialist Chambers and the Specialist
Prosecutor’s Office in Kosovo: The ‘Regionalization’ of International Criminal Justice in
Context, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 53, 59–60 (2016); Sarah Williams, The Specialist Chambers
of Kosovo: The Limits of Internationalization?, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 25, 26–27 (2016).
101 CARLA DEL PONTE & CHUCK SUDETIC, MADAME PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS
WITH HUMANITY’S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY (2009).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 76–77.
104 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Inhuman Treatment of People and
Illicit Trafficking in Human Organs in Kosovo, Doc. 12462 (Jan. 7, 2011).
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responsible for numerous crimes against Serbs remaining in Kosovo, and crimes
against other persons perceived as political opponents to the group’s activities.105
The report also notes that these crimes remained unpunished until its 2010 publica-
tion date, and that some top KLA leaders were involved in some of the crimes.106
The next step was the European Union’s (EU) addition of a new element to its
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which consisted of a mandate to conduct
investigations into war crimes and organized crime as alleged in the Marty Report.107
This mandate was to be executed by the Special Investigative Task Force (SITF).108
It was soon realized that this mandate outgrew both the ability and also possibly the
duration of EULEX.109 As a next step, an exchange of letters between Kosovo and
the EU confirmed that Kosovo would commit itself to creating an environment con-
ducive to the proper administration of justice in any trial and appellate proceedings
arising from the SITF investigations.110
On July 29, 2014, the SITF Prosecutor indicated that there was enough evidence
for an indictment against senior KLA officials responsible for a campaign of perse-
cution against ethnic Serb, Roma, and other minority populations of Kosovo.111 In
Kosovo, the necessary amendments were made to the Kosovo Constitution with a
view towards creating the new Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s
Office.112 On August 3, 2015, Kosovo implemented the amendments to its constitu-
tion and enacted the law necessary to fulfill its obligations under its agreement with
the EU to create the Specialist Chambers in the Courts of Kosovo.113
Since its creation, a number of changes have been made to turn the KSC into a
functioning court. Judges, a prosecutor, and a registrar have been appointed,114 and
the KSC’s applicable law has developed.115 The creation of Rules of Procedure and
Evidence was a particularly important first task reserved to the judges.116 As further
explored in the following section, these rules had to be reviewed by some of the
105 See id.
106 Id.
107 Matthew E. Cross, Equipping the Specialist Chambers of Kosovo to Try Transnational
Crimes: Remarks on Independence and Cooperation, 14 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 73, 78 (2016).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 78–79.
111 Spec. Investigative Task Force, Statement of the Chief Prosecutor of the Special Investi-
gative Task Force: 29 July 2014 1–2 (2014), http://www.hlc-rdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014
/07/statement_of_the_chief_Prosecutor_of_the_SITF_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/V57E-K4ZQ].
112 Cross, supra note 107, at 80.
113 Id. at 80–81.
114 See Kosovo Specialist Chambers & Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, First Report 8–9
(2018) [hereinafter First Report], https://www.scp-ks.org/sites/default/files/public/content/ksc
_spo_first_report_en.pdf.
115 Id. at 22.
116 Id.
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judges who sit in the Constitutional Chamber, with the goal of ensuring their con-
sistency with Kosovo’s Constitution, especially with human rights law.117
It exceeds the scope—and is not the objective—of this Article to examine various
features of the KSC, or to address the essential question of to what degree the cre-
ation of the KSC was indeed necessary, or whether these crimes could also have
been investigated and prosecuted by other fora. Instead, this Article concentrates on
several aspects of the KSC that are relevant for understanding its procedural design.
The KSC is a unique internationalized court, established for the first time, on the
basis of an agreement between the EU and a state, Kosovo.118 Within this category of
internationalized—or hybrid or mixed—courts dealing with international crimes, there
are variations in how much domestic law governs procedure versus newly created
rules of an international character.119 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC), for example, relies heavily on domestic criminal procedure, as
demonstrated by the adoption of a full investigating judge, as is the law and practice
within Cambodia.120
The KSC is formally part of the Kosovo court structure,121 but its operation does
not appear to be based on the law and practice of the ordinary courts of Kosovo.122
Yet KSC law requires judges to be guided by the Kosovo Code on Criminal Proce-
dure in the determination of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“the Rules”).123
117 Id.
118 See Cross, supra note 107, at 74–75.
119 See id. at 75, 86.
120 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules, at R. 14, SS-64
(rev.9 2015).
121 Compare On the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, L. No. 05/L-053
[hereinafter On the Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office], art. 1(2) (Kos.) (“Spe-
cialist Chambers within the Kosovo justice system and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office are
necessary to fulfil the international obligations undertaken in Law No. 04/L-274, to guarantee
the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution of the
Republic of Kosovo, and to ensure secure, independent, impartial, fair and efficient criminal
proceedings in relation to allegations of grave trans-boundary and international crimes com-
mitted during and in the aftermath of the conflict in Kosovo, which relate to those reported in
the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Report Doc 12462 of 7 January 2011 (‘The
Council of Europe Assembly Report’) and which have been the subject of criminal investiga-
tion by the Special Investigative Task Force (‘SITF’) of the Special Prosecution Office of the
Republic of Kosovo (‘SPRK’).”) (emphasis added), with id. art. 3(1) (“Specialist Chambers shall
be attached to each level of the court system in Kosovo . . . .”).
122 See id. art. 3(4) (“Any other Kosovo law, regulation, piece of secondary regulation, other
rule or custom and practice which has not been expressly incorporated into this Law shall not
apply to the organisation, administration, functions or jurisdiction of the Specialist Chambers
and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. This Law shall prevail over any and all contrary provisions
of any other law or regulation.”).
123 See id. art. 19(2) (“The Rules of Procedure and Evidence shall reflect the highest stan-
dards of international human rights law including the ECHR and ICCPR with a view to
ensuring a fair and expeditious trial taking into account the nature, location and specificities
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It remains to be seen, however, to what degree the Kosovo Code of Criminal Proce-
dure has indeed been taken into consideration in developing the Rules. It seems that
the judges, in light of their backgrounds and expertise, have been borrowing from
the procedural law and practice of various international and internationalized criminal
tribunals as they existed in 2015, and which the judges deemed most suitable to
ensure both an effective and fair functioning of the KSC.124 It appears that a similar
process took place at the ECCC, where, in spite of a statement in the agreement
setting up the ECCC that the procedure would be in accordance with Cambodian
law,125 the judges were keen on developing their own procedural law which bor-
rowed largely from the law of international criminal tribunals.126
In the context of the KSC, the exhortation is only to be “guided” by Kosovo
criminal procedure, which arguably leaves more room for making different choices.127
All elements of KSC procedure, from the very first investigations up to the appeal
phase and beyond, are exclusively governed by the law of the KSC, especially its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.128
On March 17, 2017, the Plenary of the KSC’s judges adopted the Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence in accordance with Article 19(1) of the Law on the KSC.129 The
Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court had been assigned the task of review-
ing the legality of the Rules adopted by the Plenary, as provided for in Article 19(5)
of the Law on the KSC.130 Obviously, the judges in the Specialist Chamber of the
of the proceedings to be heard by the Specialist Chambers. In determining its Rules of Procedure
and Evidence the Specialist Chambers shall be guided by the Kosovo Criminal Procedure Code
2012, Law No. 04/L-123.”) (emphasis added).
124 See id.; see also Cross, supra note 107, at 84–85.
125 See U.N.-Cambodia, art. 12(1), Apr. 29, 2005, 2329 U.N.T.S. 41723 (detailing part of
the agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia con-
cerning the prosecution under Cambodian law of crimes committed during the period of
Democratic Kampuchea).
126 But see Göran Sluiter, Due Process and Criminal Procedure in the Cambodian
Extraordinary Chambers, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 314, 320 (2006).
127 On the Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 121, art. 19(2)
(“The Rules of Procedure and Evidence shall reflect the highest standards of international human
rights law including the ECHR and ICCPR with a view to ensuring a fair and expeditious trial
taking into account the nature, location and specificities of the proceedings to be heard by the
Specialist Chambers. In determining its Rules of Procedure and Evidence the Specialist Cham-
bers shall be guided by the Kosovo Criminal Procedure Code 2012, Law No. 04/L-123.”)
(emphasis added).
128 Cross, supra note 107, at 84.
129 April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, at 1. See generally On the Specialist Chambers
and Special Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 121, art. 19(1) (“The Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence for the conduct of proceedings before the Specialist Chambers shall be adopted by the
Specialist Chambers Judges sitting in Plenary as soon as possible following their appointment
and placement on the Roster of International Judges. The Judges of the Specialist Chamber of
the Constitutional Court shall not participate in the adoption.”).
130 Id. art. 19(5) (“Following adoption or amendment, the adopted Rules or amendment
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Constitutional Court were not part of the plenary that adopted the Rules.131 The Judg-
ment on the referral of the Rules and their legality was issued on April 26, 2017.132
IV. THE JUDGMENT OF APRIL 26, 2017
The fact that the KSC inserted a mechanism of judicial review in its lawmaking
process pertaining to its draft rules of procedure and evidence was largely unheard
of in international criminal justice.133 The idea was that the Rules, as a result of this
review, would be of a better quality and would fully comply with human rights
law.134 It is a good and creative solution to improving the quality of what is in essence
a legislative process, namely developing the procedural law of an international or
internationalized criminal tribunal that can be emulated by other courts.135
The KSC procedure is also thorough in the case of Rules that are thought to be
inconsistent with the Constitution; in such instances, the amended Rules need to be
referred for review by the Constitutional Chamber.136 This occurred within a couple
of months and at this time the Constitutional Chamber held that the adopted Rules
were not inconsistent with the Constitution.137 Thus, every amendment in the Rules
needs to pass by the Constitutional Chamber scrutiny.138
In its first review judgment, the Chamber explained how it saw its scope of re-
view.139 In this respect, it is especially important to understand the framework in
to the Rules shall be referred to the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court, which shall
have thirty (30) days to review the Rules or amendments to ensure compliance with Chapter II,
including Article 55, of the Constitution. In the event that the Specialist Chamber of the Con-
stitutional Court determines an inconsistency with the Constitution, that determination shall
be sent to the Judges in Plenary for action on the affected provision or provisions. The Judges
of the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court shall not participate in that action.”).
131 Id. art. 19(1).
132 April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, at 57.
133 See On the Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 121, art.
49(6).
134 See First Report, supra note 114, at 22.
135 See id. But see Göran Sluiter, Procedural Lawmaking at the International Criminal
Tribunals, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (Shane
Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds., 2011) (“With reason, one must be extremely suspicious about
the accumulation of such significant [lawmaking] powers within one body, namely, the judici-
ary. This is especially the case when the rule-making process is non-transparent and when there
is no external supervision of the role judges perform within the ICTY.”).
136 See First Report, supra note 114, at 22–24.
137 Judgment on the Referral of Revised Rules of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
Adopted by Plenary on 29 May 2017 to the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court Pur-
suant to Article 19(5) of Law no. 05/L-053 on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s
Office, Case No. KSC-CC-PR-2017-03, Kos. Specialist Chambers 2 (June 28, 2017), https://
www.scp-ks.org/en/documents/judgment-referral-revised-rules-rules-procedure-and-evidence
-adopted-plenary-29-may-2017.
138 Id. at 3.
139 See April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 10–11.
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which the review takes place, namely that which is laid out in Chapter II of the
Kosovo Constitution.140
Chapter II of the Kosovo Constitution is entitled “Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms.”141 Three features of this section need to be mentioned. First, Articles
23–52 provide a rather elaborate set of rights, a number of which are directly rele-
vant for criminal proceedings.142 Second, Article 22 provides for the direct effect of
major human rights instruments, such as the ECHR, in the legal order of Kosovo and
their priority over other sources of law.143 It is worth noting that, because Kosovo
was a very young state, it was not necessary to be a party for the effect of these
human rights instruments.144 One should also read Article 53 of the Constitution,
which obliges authorities to interpret the rights set out in the Constitution in a manner
consistent with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).145
Third, having special significance in the analysis of the Constitutional Chamber, Ar-
ticle 55 sets out strict conditions regarding the limitation of human rights, with the
bottom line being, as stipulated in Article 55(5), that the “limitation of fundamental
rights . . . shall in no way deny the essence of the guaranteed right.”146
Since the adopted Rules have not yet been tested in any concrete case, the Con-
stitutional Chamber had to evaluate the Rules in abstracto, on the basis of their
language, i.e., their ordinary meaning.147 This means that, according to the Chamber,
“where the plain meaning of a provision . . . is manifestly contrary to the tenor of the
Constitution, the Court will find that such a provision is not in compliance with the
Constitution.”148 The Chamber also mentions that it will not easily conclude that a
provision of the Rules is inconsistent with the Constitution, i.e., human rights law.149
Reading the entire Judgment, it becomes clear that the scope of review for the
Rules tends to appear more full than marginal. This is not only evidenced by the
detailed analysis of a number of “problematic” Rules, but also by the Chamber’s
holdings. Ultimately, no fewer than thirteen provisions were declared to be in vio-
lation of human rights law;150 in respect to one provision, the Chamber considered
itself unable to declare it consistent with human rights law.151
140 Const. Of the Republic of Kosovo, Ch. 11 (Kos.) (http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/reposi
tory/docs/Constitution1Kosovo.pdf).
141 Id. art. 21–22.
142 Id. art. 23–52.
143 Id. art. 22.
144 See id.
145 Id. art. 53.
146 Id. art. 55(5).
147 See April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 13–14.
148 Id. ¶ 13.
149 Id. ¶ 17.
150 Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
151 Id. ¶ 216 (“In addition, the Court is unable to find that Rule 134(3) is consistent with
Chapter II of the Constitution.”).
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Although the Judgment deals with a considerable number of Rules that engage
human rights, this Article concentrates on parts of the Judgment dealing with the
Rules pertaining to investigations and detention on remand.
Paragraphs 58–107, a considerable portion of the Judgment, deal with the rights
of persons during investigation.152 In this section, the Chamber examines whether
a number of investigative measures are in compliance with the Constitution, i.e.,
human rights law.153
This examination starts with Rules 31–33, which provide for the authorization
of special investigative measures and regulation of their execution;154 these special
investigative measures include, according to Rule 2(1), covert video surveillance,
covert monitoring of conversations and the interception of telecommunications and
communications by a computer network, and require authorization by a panel of
judges (Rule 32), or in exceptional circumstances may be ordered directly by the
Specialist Prosecutor (Rule 33).155 The Chamber’s—correct—starting point is that
such measures constitute an interference with an individual’s right to respect for
privacy as guaranteed under Article 36 of the Constitution and by Article 8 of the
ECHR.156 The analysis then centers around the question of whether the limitation on
the right to privacy, as will take place in case of application of Rules 31–33, has been
done in accordance with the law—as required by the Constitution and human rights
law.157 The law limiting this right “must meet certain quality requirements: it must be
accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects,” and “the law must
provide adequate and effective safeguards and guarantees against abuse.”158 After
the enunciation of these general principles, and having regard for the case law of the
ECtHR,159 the Chamber sets out the minimum safeguards that should be available
in the law authorizing and regulating these specific investigative measures. These
minimum safeguards include specification of the nature of offences which may give
rise to an inception order, a definition of the categories of people able to have their
phones tapped, a limit on the duration of tapping, the procedure to be followed for
examining, using and storing obtained data, identification of the precautions to be
taken when communicating said data to other parties, and specification of the circum-
stances in which recordings may or must be erased or destroyed.160 Especially in the
case of a more serious interference with the right to privacy, for example in the case of
a wiretap, the Chamber concludes that these minimum safeguards are not adequately
152 Id. ¶¶ 58–107.
153 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 61–68.
154 Id. ¶ 59.
155 Id. ¶¶ 59–60.
156 Id. ¶ 60.
157 Id. ¶ 42.
158 Id.
159 Id. The analysis of ECtHR case law can be found in paragraphs 64–66 of the judgment.
Id. ¶¶ 64–66.
160 Id. ¶ 66.
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protected in the Rules.161 To summarize, the following aspects of the Rules are con-
sidered problematic and have led the Chamber to hold these Rules in violation of the
Constitution, and human rights law:
1. The offences giving rise to the investigative measures have not been
specified and it is doubtful whether all offences including those punish-
able by a fine would warrant this degree of interference with the right
to privacy;162
2. “Rules 31–33 do not define the categories of persons in respect of
whom the special investigative measures may be applied”;163
3. The Rules allow for infringements on the right to privacy without need-
ing a reasonable suspicion as to the identity of a suspect and without
having in place a special regime for intercepting communications be-
tween an individual suspect and his or her counsel;164
4. “The Rules . . . lack sufficient precision in terms of the duration of an
intercepted communication”;165 and
5. Finally, the Rules are not sufficiently clear and lack clarity concerning
using and storing the data obtained.166
Rules 34, 35, and 36 deal with the investigative measures of searches and sei-
zures.167 The examination of these rules follows the same pattern as the examination
of special investigative measures, focusing on whether the limitations of the right
to privacy are in accordance with the law.168 Again, the conclusion drawn by the
Chamber is that this is not the case.169 In short, the Rules on searches and seizures
are drafted in too broad terms,170 and fail to impose an obligation on the authorizing
Panel to consider the search and seizure operation’s investigative necessity.171 More-
over, the powers conferred upon the Specialist Prosecutor to carry out searches and
seizures—without prior judicial authorization—are too broad;172 this is not counter-
balanced by the availability of an ex post facto judicial review in Rule 35 (3).173
161 Id. ¶ 69.
162 Id.
163 Id. ¶ 70.
164 Id. ¶ 71.
165 Id. ¶ 72.
166 Id. ¶ 73.
167 Id. ¶ 76.
168 See id. ¶ 80.
169 Id. ¶ 88.
170 Id. ¶ 81.
171 Id. ¶ 82.
172 Id. ¶¶ 85–86.
173 See id. ¶ 87.
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Finally, Rule 36 (governing the execution of searches and seizures) has not been
formulated with the requisite degree of precision.174
The last Rule examined by the Chamber in the framework of investigative mea-
sures is Rule 38. Rule 38 deals with expert examinations, which concerns collection
of blood samples, body tissue, DNA and other similar material that cannot be examined
without bodily intrusion.175 This Rule implicates the right to personal integrity and
the right to respect for privacy under Articles 26 and 36 of the Constitution, and
Article 8 of the ECHR.176 Again, interference with this right is only permissible if it
takes place in accordance with the law. The Chamber finds it, in this light, problem-
atic that no judicial authorization is required under this Rule. Likewise, there are no
procedural safeguards ensuring proportionality of the interference, and there is no
ex post facto judicial review.177 Furthermore, the Chamber finds the retention of
bodily material to be for too long a duration and without sufficient safeguards.178
In addition to examining these investigative measures, the Chamber has also
considered whether the Rules on arrest and detention, as set out in Chapter 4 of the
Rules, are in compliance with international human rights law.179 The right to liberty
finds protection in, amongst other sources, Article 5 ECHR and Article 9 of the
ICCPR.180 The general principles of ECtHR case law on pretrial detention are aptly
enunciated in paragraphs 113–15 of the judgment.181 In very simple terms, the con-
ditions for detention on remand under human rights law require that there always be
a persistent reasonable suspicion to justify detention, and after a certain lapse of
time, other grounds should exist to justify the continuation of detention, such as a
risk of flight.182 In addition, Judges should consider alternative measures for deten-
tion, should properly reason why prolonged detention is necessary, and should
ensure that the presumption remains in favor of liberty.183
In its evaluation of the law on detention, the Chamber focused in particular on
Rule 54(4), which stipulates that a “detained person shall not be released without the
consent of [the] State” from which the detained person seeks to be released.184 The
Chamber found that while some delay in carrying out a decision of release may be
understandable, making this execution fully dependent upon the consent of a State
is clearly problematic.185 The Chamber considered that “any detention in those
174 Id. ¶¶ 91–95.
175 Id. ¶ 96.
176 Id. ¶ 97.
177 Id. ¶ 103.
178 Id. ¶¶ 105–06.
179 Id. ¶ 110.
180 ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 9; April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 111.
181 April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 113–15.
182 Id. ¶ 114.
183 Id. ¶ 115.
184 Id. ¶ 118.
185 Id. ¶¶ 119–20.
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circumstances would lack the necessary legal basis and would not be a lawful de-
tention.”186 As a result, this part of Rule 54 was held to be inconsistent with Article 29
of the Constitution and human rights law.187
V. EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS
The scrutiny of the KSC Rules in light of human rights law as performed by the
Constitutional Chamber raises two important questions, which are the subject of the
present Section. First, one may wonder whether the analysis and findings by the
Constitutional Chamber are fully correct, bearing in mind the special context of the
KSC. Second, if there is some merit in the findings of the Constitutional Chamber
what are the implications thereof for international criminal tribunals, such as the
ICC? Does it mean that the law and practices of the ICC in investigations and
detention should be radically transformed?
A. Evaluation
Let us start with an evaluation of the Chamber’s findings on the Rules, and
especially their conclusion that the ordinary meaning of important Rules for investi-
gations and detention are in violation of international human rights law.
It appears that throughout the Judgment, the use of ECtHR case law is thorough
and generally correct. However, if one studies some of the ECtHR cases more in
depth, their applicability to a given rule may not always be clear. For example, in
the analysis of Rule 54(4), making provisional release dependent on acceptance by
a state, the ECtHR is more complex than that set out in the Judgment.188 A distinc-
tion is made in ECtHR case law between court orders for release which are ineffec-
tive, or the system in place lacking the possibility to order release, and interference
in the execution of orders for release.189 The Constitutional Chamber essentially
based its review of Rule 38 on a case dealing with non-release as a result of external
interference.190 In Assanidze, the Court did not focus on provisional release, but
rather on continued detention after a final acquittal.191 It would be more fitting for
the Chamber to have based its analysis on ECtHR cases focusing on the ineffectiveness
186 Id. ¶ 120.
187 Id. ¶ 122.
188 Id. ¶¶ 118–23.
189 See the opposing situations in Assanidze v. Georgia, 2004-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 221 and
Schiesser v. Switzerland, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). The situation in Schiesser was one
in which the applicant came before an official who was supposed to rule on the lawfulness
of detention, but could not effectively order release in case he was to conclude that the de-
tention was unlawful. Schiesser, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. In Assanidze, the applicant’s release was
ordered by the court after a final acquittal, but as a result of outside interference, that release
was blocked. Assanidze, 2004-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 221.
190 See Assanidze, 2004-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 221; April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 101.
191 April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 113.
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of the power to order release, following long-established ECtHR case law illustrat-
ing that a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power is
supposed to be able to release the person whose detention she is reviewing.192
More significant than this issue of applying the most suitable ECtHR judgment, is
the question whether ECtHR case law is fully applicable to the KSC. It is clear that
none of the ECtHR judgments deal with the unique context of an international, or
internationalized criminal tribunal.193 As already mentioned in Part I, this raises the
question of whether ECtHR findings can be applied lock-stock-and-barrel to this inter-
national context. In his thorough study on this precise matter, Krit Zeegers provides a
framework in which recalibration of the rights in a non-national context can be possible:
The second approach to IHRL that can be discerned from the
ICT’s law and practice is contextualization. . . . Four contextual
factors in particular have been subject of this study: the unavoid-
able reliance on state cooperation, the gravity of the crimes with
which accused persons are charged, the complexity of cases before
the ICTs, and, finally, the fundamental importance of the ICTs’
mission to ‘end impunity’.194
The KSC Constitutional Chamber has not addressed whether one of these four factors,
be it under strict conditions, can justify a contextualization of ECtHR case law in the
context of the KSC.195
In the defense of the Constitutional Chamber, it must be mentioned that the
Chamber appeared to have little choice other than reviewing the Rules in light of
ECtHR case law, as this clearly follows from the Constitution.196 But in its analysis
of the ECtHR case law it would have been worthwhile to address, albeit very briefly,
the question of whether this case law lends itself to a full, unmodified application
to the KSC, or whether there are particular reasons, including those mentioned by
Zeegers above, that can justify adjustments to that case law.197
192 See, e.g., Schiesser, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 31; see also Ryabikin v. Russia, App. No. 8320/04,
48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55, ¶ 137 (2008); Mckay v. United Kingdom, 2006-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 325, ¶ 35;
Öcalan v Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, ¶¶ 71–75; Stafford v. United Kingdom, 2002-IV
Eur. Ct. H.R. 115, ¶ 88; Curley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32340/96, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 14,
¶ 32 (2000); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 199 (1976).
193 But see April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 37–38.
194 ZEEGERS, supra note 49, at 403.
195 See April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 11 (noting that ECtHR case law is in
the court’s scope but not stating factors).
196 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Apr. 7, 2008, art. 53 (“Human rights and funda-
mental freedoms guaranteed by this Constitution shall be interpreted consistent with the court
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.”).
197 See April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 16 (explaining that the court will interpret
human rights in a manner that is consistent with ECtHR case law without providing any rea-
sons why).
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In a similar vein, it would have been helpful if the Judgment paid some attention
to the full picture of the applicable law in the case of investigations. Since the Con-
stitutional Chamber found that the investigative measures in the Rules are in violation
of human rights law, because—simply—said measures have not been sufficiently reg-
ulated, this begs the question of whether other sources of law could have compen-
sated for that, providing a legal framework that could have holistically enjoyed the
benefit of the doubt. The law of the KSC appears to be rather self-contained, leaving
little room for external sources, such as ordinary Kosovo criminal procedure.198
Article 3(4) of the Law on the KSC clearly stipulates that any other piece of Kosovo
law shall not apply to the functioning of the KSC.199 Yet, Rule 4(1) indicates that the
Rules shall be interpreted, where appropriate, in a manner consonant with the Kosovo
Code of Criminal Procedure.200 This may open the door to some degree, albeit a very
limited degree, to the applicability of domestic criminal procedure in the operation of,
for example, search and seizures and wiretaps, which could fill some of the regula-
tory gaps identified by the Constitutional Chamber.201
In addition, the Constitutional Chamber does not differentiate between investi-
gations on Kosovo territory and elsewhere.202 This appears relevant as the question
may arise as to what extent, from a human rights perspective, the regulation of
investigative measures in the Rules has to be of the same degree of specificity for
both situations. In the case of investigative measures in Kosovo, the orders of Judges
have a direct effect and are exclusively governed by the KSC Law, especially the
Rules.203 However, in the case of investigative measures in other States, as provided
for by Article 55 of the Law on the KSC,204 their execution will also be governed by
relevant domestic laws which may be sufficient to fill certain gaps in the Rules.205
It remains uncertain from reading the Judgment whether the Constitutional Chamber
has considered these different scenarios and how this would impact the human rights
analysis of the Rules under review.206
198 On the Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 121, art. 3, ¶ 4.
199 Id.
200 Kos. Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Off., Rules of Procedure and
Evidence before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, r.24(1).
201 Id.; April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 79–95.
202 See April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 79–95 (failing to differentiate between
investigations in Kosovo and elsewhere).
203 On the Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 121, art. 19, ¶ 2.
204 Id. art. 55, ¶ 1 (“The Specialist Chambers, the Registry and the Specialist Prosecutor may
request the assistance and co-operation from other states, international organisations and other
entities as is necessary for the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing
crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Specialist Chambers, and the fulfilment of
the Specialist Chambers’ other responsibilities. In accordance with Article 4, the Specialist
Chambers, the Registry and the Specialist Prosecutor may enter into such arrangements as are
necessary for this purpose.”).
205 Id. art. 3, ¶¶ 2–3.
206 See April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1.
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It is certainly possible to criticize some aspects of the KSC Constitutional Cham-
ber’s human rights assessment of its Rules. But such criticism does not alter the fact
that the KSC Constitutional Chamber has put a number of pertinent human rights
issues on the international criminal justice agenda.207
B. Implications
It is therefore essential to address the broader question of what the implications
of the KSC Judgment are for international criminal tribunals, especially the ICC.
I will start with the least complex matter, namely that according to the Constitu-
tional Chamber, it is a violation of the right to liberty when the provisional release
of a suspect is made dependent upon the cooperation of a state.208 This finding
directly contradicts the position adopted by the ICC Appeals Chamber in the Bemba
case, in which the Chamber also made release conditional upon the State’s willing-
ness to accept the person to be released.209 In a previous publication, I have criticized
this position adopted by the Appeals Chamber:
It seems to follow from reference to dependence upon state coop-
eration that the Appeals Chamber regards this as a non-mandatory
form of cooperation. As a result, the compliance with fundamen-
tal human rights norms in the functioning of the ICC is made
completely dependent upon whether or not a state agrees to
accept a person who is eligible for release. The respect of funda-
mental human rights norms cannot be made conditional upon
such highly uncertain factors. The Appeals Chamber does not
embark upon an analysis of the inevitable consequences of this
position; should we infer from this finding that even in the most
serious violations of the right to liberty a person will not be
released if not accepted by a state?210
The KSC Constitutional Chamber now confirms that it is not tenable, from a human
rights perspective, to have deprivation of liberty continue simply because the detained
207 Id. at 56 (holding that multiple rules of procedure and evidence before the Kosovo
Specialist Chambers violated Chapter II of the Constitution).
208 Id. at 29–30.
209 Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against
Pre-Trial Chamber II’s “Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and
Convening Hearings with the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Portugal, the Republic
of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South
Africa,” ¶ 106 (Dec. 2, 2009).
210 Göran Sluiter, Atrocity Crimes Litigation: Some Human Rights Concerns Occasioned
by Selected 2009 Case Law, 8 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 248, 265 (2010) [hereinafter Sluiter,
Atrocity Crimes Litigation] (footnotes omitted).
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individual is not welcome in any state.211 In such a scenario, there is always an option,
and that option is to simply release the detained person in the State where he or she
is effectively detained, i.e., the host state.212
One can safely say that there are no substantive justifications in favor of contin-
uing detention in this scenario. Nothing in the context of international criminal justice
can justify continuing detention under these circumstances. As far as it would still be
the prevailing view of the ICC—Appeals Chamber—it would have to be reversed.
Turning now to the matter of under-regulated investigations, I submit that the
findings of the Constitutional Chamber can have far-reaching implications for the
ICC. As analyzed in Part II, the law of international criminal procedure has taken
a very loose approach to the principle of procedural legality until now.213 Investiga-
tive powers in the ICC, for example, are phrased in very broad terms; certain
investigative activities, including invasive investigative activities, are not regulated
at all and certainly do not contain safeguards.214 One will not find any rules in the
law of the ICC on wiretaps, search and seizure operations, or collection of DNA
material, though such powers appear to be subsumed under the very broad power of
the ICC Prosecutor to collect evidence under Article 54 (3) (a) of the ICC Statute.215
Compared to the minimalistic provisions of the ICC, the KSC Rules, as adopted
by the Judges prior to review by the Constitutional Chamber, already constitute a very
serious effort to comply with basic rules of procedural legality and requirements
from human rights law, by regulating at least some important aspects of invasive in-
vestigative measures.216 The ICC does not come close to these efforts.217
One must acknowledge that in drafting the Rules, the KSC Judges were under
a relatively strict mandate to comprehensively legislate its procedure,218 and to be
guided by Kosovo law of criminal procedure.219 Conversely, as analyzed in Part II,
in the context of the ICC, there is no prior national guidance on procedure, and
investigative measures are to some degree also governed by national law on criminal
211 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
212 See Sluiter, Atrocity Crimes Litigation, supra note 210, at 267. The role of the host State
in this matter:
But it needs to be borne in mind that Article 5 of the ECHR and Article 9
of the ICCPR impose obligations on the Netherlands, which, at a very
minimum, require it to engage constructively with the ICC in ensuring the
protection of the right to liberty of individuals present on Dutch territory.
213 See supra notes 63–76 and accompanying text.
214 See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 53–61.
215 Id. art. 54(3)(a).
216 See On the Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 121, art. 21,
35 (outlining the rights of the accused and investigative powers of the special prosecutor).
217 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
218 See On the Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 121, art.
3, ¶ 4.
219 See id. art. 19, ¶ 2.
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procedure.220 Furthermore, it was felt that the procedural law of the ICC should not
unduly delay its creation, which could be the case if detailed and specific rules gov-
erning investigations were put in place.
Another argument against too hastily assuming strong implications of the KSC
Judgment for the ICC is the very strong reliance by the KSC on the ECHR and the
ECtHR case law.221 The ECHR is relevant for the ICC and has been used on many
occasions, but its impact on the ICC, an international—as opposed to a regional—
institution, need not be as strong as is the case with the KSC.
While this all may justify a looser approach to the principle of procedural legality
within the context of the ICC, the manner in which investigations are regulated—or
rather not regulated—at the ICC appears to no longer be in keeping with international
human rights law, even if the impact of the KSC Judgment is taken at its lowest.
Regulation of investigative activities is—with reason—required under human
rights law. Such regulation embodies the essence of the rule of law and due process,
as investigative measures interfere with individual rights, such as the right to privacy;
accordingly, such regulation has a clear, accessible and high-quality basis in written
law. The case law of the ECtHR offers valuable guidance of what should, at least from
a human rights perspective, be part of the law authorizing investigative measures
which interfere with individual rights. These are minimum standards, inherent in the
dignity of every individual; standards which, in principle, need to be respected.
In the special context of the ICC, some debate may be expected as to the exact
scope and content of the safeguards governing investigative measures. However, when
invasive investigative measures such as wiretaps and search and seizure operations
are not regulated at all, and can be easily requested by a Prosecutor making use of the
broad power to collect evidence, the law of criminal procedure drops below the mini-
mum standards of human rights law, and there is no convincing justification for that.
The law and practice governing investigative measures in national justice systems
involved in the execution of ICC-investigations can never adequately compensate
for this defect in ICC law, for two simple reasons. First, in light of the fact that ICC-
investigations may involve a great number of justice systems, including those who do
not sufficiently—or not at all—respect the rule of law and due process norms, there
is no way of ensuring that all relevant national law and practices are in conformity
with the requisite human rights standards. Second, as mentioned earlier, the national
justice system that may be executing—or is involved in—the investigative measures
in practice, is unlikely to effectively provide the required safeguards. Only the trial
forum, i.e., only the ICC, can, for example, properly assess whether a specific investi-
gative measure is necessary and proportionate to the interference of rights and the
needs of the investigation, and what should be a reasonable duration in light of the
220 See supra notes 60–65, 88–93 and accompanying text.
221 See April 2017 KSC Judgment, supra note 1 (citing ECHR and ECtHR case law to
support the Court’s decision).
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investigation as a whole.222 Another example of safeguards within the exclusive re-
sponsibility of the ICC is the results of national level investigations, which are to be
transferred to the ICC;223 rules related to the reception and storage of especially sensi-
tive material, such as DNA, must thus be available within the context of the ICC.224
It is interesting that the law of the ICC contains no such safeguards. Even if certain
safeguards regarding invasive investigative measures are available in lower-level
sources of law, or quasi-law such as directives, protocols or policy documents, or could
be inferred from such sources, this would not be sufficient. Such rules must be clear,
precise, and publicly available. Providing for explicit and precise safeguards at the
level of the Statute, or Rules of Procedure and Evidence, thus appears imperative.
Until now, ICC case law regarding investigations has tended to focus on possi-
ble violations of safeguards in the execution of investigative requests required at the
national level.225 For example, in the case of Bemba, the admissibility of evidence
collected in Austria was challenged on account of violations of national law, as
confirmed by an Austrian judgment.226 The defense complained that the collection
of evidence did not live up to safeguards available under Austrian law and that, as
a result, the evidence obtained (documents from Western Union), was in violation
of the right to privacy and thus should be excluded from the proceedings.227
The Trial Chamber acknowledged that there were problems in the application
of Austrian law, and that this had violated the accused’s right to privacy.228 The
Chamber then held that the violation was not serious enough to trigger exclusion of
the evidence as a remedy.229 Interestingly, the Chamber paid some attention to the
interaction between the Prosecutor and the Austrian authorities, explaining how the
violation of the right to privacy could have occurred:
222 See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 56–57 (outlining the role and powers of the pre-
trial chamber).
223 See id.
224 See id. art. 53–61 (leaving broad discretion to the prosecutor and failing to adequately
detail safeguards against this power).
225 See Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/13, Decision on Request in Response to Two
Austrian Decisions, ¶¶ 40, 43 (July 14, 2016) (acknowledging a violation of the defendant’s
privacy rights, but not excluding the evidence obtained).
226 Id. ¶¶ 9–16.
227 Id.
228 Id. ¶ 28 (“[T]he Chamber considers that any further assessment whether there was mani-
festly unlawful conduct is not necessary and concludes that the internationally recognised right
to privacy has been violated. The Chamber is not persuaded by the Prosecution’s interpretation
that the ‘in accordance with the law’ requirement when assessing privacy infringements means
only that the correct procedural safeguards were applied, irrespective of the correctness of their
application. Following this view would lead to a merely formalistic interpretation of this safe-
guard to interfere with a person’s right to privacy, and which does not provide an effective pro-
tection of this right.”) (footnotes omitted).
229 Id. ¶¶ 40, 43.
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The Chamber agrees that the Prosecution was involved in the
process that lead to the illegally obtained material, inasmuch as
it triggered, via requests for assistance to the Austrian authori-
ties, the process of requesting the judicial orders. However, even
though the Oberlandesgericht deemed that the information pro-
vided by the Prosecution was insufficient, the Prosecution was
in no position to know this. In fact, the Prosecution had complied
with all the formal requirements by engaging with the national
authorities in order to legally obtain the requested material. As
previously stated, the Prosecution tried at all times to apprise the
Austrian authorities of its actions in respect of obtaining the
Western Union Documents. The Prosecution had also reason to
believe that it had complied with all the substantive requirements,
since the Austrian public prosecutor’s office did not request
further information and proceeded to request authorisation of the
collection of the Western Union Documents via judicial order.230
Further, and most importantly, the first-instance Austrian court
provided the judicial orders as requested, so that the Prosecution
had to assume that it had fulfilled all necessary requirements to
legally obtain the material. It is clear that the transmission of the
Western Union Documents was not per se forbidden and that the
Austrian law provides for a procedure to legally obtain them.
The Repealed Austrian Rulings also prevented the Prosecution
from potentially providing further information to the Austrian
authorities that would have more substantiated the requests in
order to meet the requirements of the Austrian law.231
These considerations by the Trial Chamber confirm how right and necessary the
KSC Judgment is for present day international criminal proceedings. The primary
issue should be whether the law of the ICC offers sufficient safeguards in its inves-
tigations. It would not have come to this situation if the Prosecutor were required to
apply for judicial authorization while respecting other rules and safeguards at the
ICC level. That said, with sufficient ICC safeguards, all parties involved, including
the Austrian authorities, would be assured that invasive investigative acts or requests
coming from the ICC are in full conformity with human rights law.
In sum, the implications of the KSC Judgment for the investigative law and
practice of the ICC are potentially big and should lead, in my view, to significant
law and policy changes at the ICC—or at other international criminal tribunals.
230 Id. ¶ 36 (footnotes omitted).
231 Id. ¶ 37.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The research question in this Article was whether, in light of the KSC Judgment
of April 26, 2017, the loose approach to procedural law in international criminal
justice—for example, there being no regulation or minimal regulation of invasive
investigative powers—is in violation of international human rights law. I conclude
that this question must be answered in the affirmative.
As examined in Part I, contemporary international criminal tribunals have incorpo-
rated human rights law in their applicable law in a variety of ways. Their commitment
to human rights law looks quite good on paper. However, international criminal tribu-
nals tend to be created with urgency or only after a few years of negotiation. Moreover,
there is no national tradition of criminal procedure or due process to fall back on.
The organization of criminal procedure at international criminal tribunals echoes
the desire to keep it short and simple. On the one hand, this is understandable, as the
elaboration of detailed procedural and investigative rules, at times the result of lengthy
negotiations between states (the ICC), may risk seriously delaying the effective
functioning of the system. On the other hand, the absence of safeguards in the regu-
lation of invasive investigative powers, such as search and seizure operations and
wiretaps, raises serious human rights issues, which have, until now, been glossed
over in international criminal proceedings.
This may change with the Judgment of the KSC Constitutional Chamber, as the
KSC Rules of Procedure and Evidence were submitted to a thorough human rights
assessment. Unlike the ICC and other international criminal tribunals, the KSC Rules
contain a number of provisions attempting to regulate invasive investigatory powers.
Even so, the Constitutional Chamber’s judgment was loud and clear: the regulation
of investigative powers in the KSC Rules still lacked sufficient safeguards and were
therefore in violation of international human rights law. The KSC Constitutional
Chamber’s legal analysis may not have been flawless in every detail, but it is, by
and large, solid and convincing.
Applying the findings of the KSC to international criminal tribunals such as the
ICC, the question was then addressed as to whether the law of the ICC on investiga-
tions is in need of serious reform. I believe this to be the case. The lack of safeguards
in the ICC’s law on investigative powers cannot be sufficiently compensated by
other—i.e., national—rules that might also govern ICC investigative activities in
practice. These national rules may not be adequate enough or may not be available
at all. What is more, certain safeguards, like judging whether an invasive investigative
measure is really needed, or whether its scope and duration are proportionate, can
only be effective when available at the level of the ICC. Without these safeguards,
as is the case at present, the ICC law and practice on investigations is in violation of
human rights law and is in need of serious reform. The KSC Judgment offers the
highly needed incentive and guidance to make such reforms.
